// Accounting Professor · SMU Cox

When information breaks, who pays?

I study the forces that distort information in capital markets — racial bias in analyst forecasts, pharmaceutical disclosure suppression, narcissistic executives, and the cognitive limits of investor attention. My work spans accounting, finance, behavioral science, and public policy.

11Top-tier
publications
5Elite journals
JFE · JAE · JAR · TAR · MS
40+Seminars & conferences
NBER · AFA · Kellogg · NYU · Yale · LBS
// latest

Updates

Mar 2026
Acceptance
Jan 2026
Publication
"CFO Narcissism and the Power of Persuasion Over Analysts" published at Review of Accounting Studies (2025), 30(3), 2419–2467.
Dec 2025
New Working Paper — Available Soon
"Embargoed Disclosure" — examining how pharmaceutical companies use embargo clauses to control clinical trial disclosure.
// research program

Three forces that distort markets

My career has been a sustained investigation into a single question: what happens when information systems in capital markets break down?

1

Information Bias & Discrimination

Racial prejudice and executive narcissism systematically distort financial intermediaries' output. I document these distortions, validate novel measurement approaches, and identify what mitigates them.

JAE 2025JAR 2017RAST 2018RAST 2025WP: Migration
2

Price Discovery & Attention

Cognitive constraints cause systematic delays in price discovery. Information acquisition paradoxically crowds out macro news. Microstructure frictions create predictable return patterns around earnings.

JFE 2014RAST 2026TAR 2020AOS 2019JFQA 2018
3

Transparency & Measurement

Firms and accounting standards suppress and omit critical information. Pharmaceutical embargoes, regulatory backfire effects, and the trillions in intangible capital missing from corporate balance sheets.

MS 2025JAR 2022JCF 2014WP: EmbargoWP: Kinky
// signature work

Featured papers

Selected publications — each distilled to one question and one takeaway.

ANALYST REACTION TO BAD NEWS White CEO Non-White CEO +57% more negative valuations for Non-White CEOs after bad news
Journal of Accounting & Economics · 2025 Racial gap in analyst valuations
CEO Race and Analyst Judgments
with K. Rupar and H. Yoon
Question
Do analysts evaluate bad news differently when a firm has a non-White CEO?
Takeaway
The evidence suggests bias appears in a setting often assumed to be objective. Analysts' target prices are 57% more negative following bad news for non-White CEOs — a subconscious bias that attenuates with familiarity and varies with societal racial sentiment. Confirmed by randomized experiment.
Policy Relevant
NON-WHITE ANALYST FORECAST ERROR 2011 2013 2016 2018 2019 2016 Presidential Election 5.7× larger effect post-election
Working Paper · Jan 2026 5.7× larger effect post-election
Migration Fear and Analyst Forecast Accuracy
with C. Wan, Y. Wang, A. Yorulmaz
Question
Does anti-immigrant sentiment impair minority analysts' ability to forecast earnings?
Takeaway
A one-SD increase in migration fear raises Non-White analysts' absolute forecast errors by $0.04 EPS — with no effect on White peers. The mechanism: Non-White analysts lose access to private information channels, evidenced by a 5.7pp decline in conference call participation during high-fear periods. Attenuated under Non-White CEO leadership and in sanctuary jurisdictions.
New Working Paper
SIGNATURE SIZE → NARCISSISM → MISREPORTING Non-narcissist X Narcissist X 98th percentile cited at JAR 5th most-cited since its year of publication · Web of Science
Journal of Accounting Research · 2017 The signature paper
CFO Narcissism and Financial Reporting Quality
with C. Ham, M. Lang, and N. Seybert
Question
Can executive psychology shape corporate reporting and firm behavior?
Takeaway
Manager personality helps explain economically meaningful differences in outcomes. Narcissistic CFOs — measured via experimentally validated signature size — produce more aggressive financial reports, have weaker internal controls, and are more likely to restate earnings. Featured in The Economist, FT, WSJ, NYT, HBR, and Washington Post.
98th Percentile Cited
PERSUASION TACTICS ON CONFERENCE CALLS Narcissistic CFO euphemisms · positive tone targets bearish analysts Analyst ↑ Overvaluation Lab experiment confirms: coercive tactics drive inflated valuations
Review of Accounting Studies · 2025 Coercive persuasion in lab + field
CFO Narcissism and the Power of Persuasion Over Analysts
with C. Ham, M. Piorkowski, and N. Seybert
Question
Do narcissistic executives intentionally manipulate the analysts who value their firms?
Takeaway
Yes — and they do it through both public and private channels. On conference calls, narcissistic CFOs use more persuasive language, more euphemisms, and strategically call on bearish analysts to argue with them. In a controlled lab study, narcissists are especially likely to deploy coercive tactics — including threatening to revoke private access — to pressure analysts into higher valuations. The overvaluation is most damaging after negative earnings news.
Mixed Methods
CORPORATE BALANCE SHEET Tangible Assets PP&E, Cash, etc. GAAP Reported MISSING R&D · SG&A · Org Capital Tangible Assets EPW Adjusted
Management Science · 2025 Trillions missing from balance sheets
Intangible Capital Measurement
with M. Ewens and R. Peters
Question
What happens when accounting omits trillions in internally generated assets?
Takeaway
Investors and researchers inherit a distorted map of firm value. We develop a structural model using acquisition prices to estimate missing intangible capital. Our parameters outperform BEA estimates, were discussed at NBER, and are applied at Morgan Stanley. Free data and code available below.
SHORT-TERM RETURN REVERSALS Normal Earnings Window six-fold increase in reversals → 1.45% announcement-window return
Journal of Financial Economics · 2014 6× reversal increase
Liquidity Provision Ahead of Earnings
with E. So
Question
Can market microstructure frictions create predictable price patterns around scheduled information events?
Takeaway
Market makers set prices below fundamental value before earnings to compensate for inventory risk, creating predictable reversals. A long-short strategy on pre-announcement returns yields 1.45% during the announcement window.
Analyst SUE (raw) Analyst SUE (adjusted) 0 kink! 0 66% kink reduced most of the "kink" is analyst behavior, not earnings management
Working Paper · Mar 2026 66% of the kink is analyst behavior
Are Analyst Forecast Errors Really Kinky?
with M. Barth, J. Jeong, and W. Landsman
Question
Is the famous "kink" in earnings surprises really caused by earnings management?
Takeaway
No — approximately 66% of the asymmetry is driven by analyst strategic behavior, not managerial manipulation. Analysts under-revise EPS forecasts while bundling directionally consistent target price and recommendation revisions. Adjusting for this predictable bias, the ratio of small beats to small misses drops from 2.43 to 1.49. Studies using meet-or-beat indicators as proxies for earnings management are partially capturing analyst strategic behavior.
New Working Paper
// complete record

All publications

01 Information Bias & Discrimination

2025
Do Sell-side Analysts React Too Pessimistically to Bad News for Minority-led Firms? · with K. Rupar, H. Yoon
J. Acct. & Econ.
BAD NEWS REACTIONWhite CEONon-White CEO57%more negative
Do analysts evaluate bad news differently when a firm has a non-White CEO?
Analysts' target prices are 57% more negative following bad news for non-White CEOs — a subconscious bias that attenuates with familiarity and varies with societal racial sentiment. Validated by a randomized experiment.
2025
CFO Narcissism and the Power of Persuasion Over Analysts · with C. Ham, M. Piorkowski, N. Seybert
Rev. Acct. Studies
CONFERENCE CALL!analystCoercive Tacticslab + archival
Do narcissistic executives intentionally manipulate the analysts who value their firms?
Narcissistic CFOs use persuasive language, euphemisms, and strategically call on bearish analysts. In a lab study, narcissists deploy coercive tactics — including threatening to cut private access — to pressure analysts into higher valuations.
2018
Narcissism is a Bad Sign: CEO Signature Size, Investment, and Performance · with C. Ham, N. Seybert
Rev. Acct. Studies
CITATION IMPACT99th %ile4th most-cited paperat RAST since its year of publicationOverinvest in R&D + M&Ayet underperform
What are the real consequences of having a narcissistic CEO?
Narcissistic CEOs overinvest in R&D and M&A but not routine capex. Their firms deliver lower profitability and cash flows. Yet narcissistic CEOs receive higher compensation. The 4th most-cited paper in RAST since its year of publication.
2017
CFO Narcissism and Financial Reporting Quality · with C. Ham, M. Lang, N. Seybert
J. Acct. Research
SIGNATURE SIZEnon-narcissistXnarcissistX98th %ilecited at JAR
Can executive psychology shape corporate reporting and firm behavior?
Narcissistic CFOs — measured via experimentally validated signature size — produce more aggressive reports, weaker internal controls, and more restatements. 5th most-cited at JAR since its year of publication. Featured in The Economist, FT, WSJ, NYT, HBR, and Washington Post.

02 Price Discovery & Attention

2026
Firm-specific Information Processing and the Delayed Discovery of Macroeconomic News · with J. Pan, E. Sul
Rev. Acct. Studies
23%of aggregate returndelayed 3 days
Does processing firm-specific news cause investors to neglect macroeconomic information?
23.2% of the aggregate market return on earnings dates is incorporated with a 3-day delay for extreme announcers. Stronger when EDGAR downloads are high and retail trading is intense.
2020
Asymmetric Timeliness and the Resolution of Investor Disagreement · with M. Barth, W. Landsman, V. Raval
The Acct. Review
PRICE DISCOVERYLow ATCHigh ATCSlowerconvergencegains ≠ losses
Does conservative accounting impede price discovery?
Asymmetric timeliness forces investors to disaggregate earnings into good/bad news components, slowing resolution of disagreement at earnings announcements. A companion model shows pricing error is increasing in asymmetry.
2019
Informational Environments and Analyst vs. Insider Information Content · solo-authored
Acct. Org. & Soc.
AnalystsInsidersIndustryexpertiseFirmexpertiseRelative information channels
Do analysts and insiders bring different types of information to markets?
Analysts have relative industry expertise; insiders have firm-specific expertise. Both rely on their comparative advantage when informing prices.
2018
Know Thy Neighbor: Industry Clusters, Information Spillovers and Market Efficiency · with J. Engelberg, A. Ozoguz
JFQA
INDUSTRY CLUSTERisolated10%faster price discovery
Does geographic proximity to industry peers improve market efficiency?
Firms in industry clusters have prices that incorporate information 10%+ faster. Geography creates spillovers. Causal evidence from exogenous firm relocations.
2014
News-driven Return Reversals: Liquidity Provision Ahead of Earnings · with E. So
J. Financial Econ.
RETURN REVERSALSNormalEarnings1.45% returnannouncement window
Can microstructure frictions create predictable price patterns around information events?
Return reversals increase six-fold during earnings announcements. Market makers demand higher compensation for inventory risk, creating predictable price concessions. 1.45% announcement-window return.

03 Transparency & Measurement

2025
Measuring Intangible Capital with Market Prices · with M. Ewens, R. Peters
Management Science
BALANCE SHEETReportedMissingActual15% smallerthan BEA estimates
What happens when accounting rules omit trillions in internally generated assets?
We estimate missing intangible capital using acquisition prices. Our estimates are 15% smaller than BEA parameters with far more cross-industry variation. Data, code, and parameters freely available.
2022
Non-GAAP Reporting, Regulatory Focus, and GAAP Aggressiveness · with R. Guggenmos, K. Rennekamp, K. Rupar
J. Acct. Research
NON-GAAP USE94%SEC scrutiny backfires
Does regulatory attention to non-GAAP reporting actually improve financial reporting quality?
Paradoxically, no. Constraining non-GAAP via SEC scrutiny pushes managers toward more aggressive GAAP earnings management instead. Non-GAAP flexibility acts as a safety valve. Validated by experiment, survey, and archival data.
2014
The Prevention of Excess Managerial Risk Taking · with E. Van Wesep
J. Corp. Finance
OPTIMAL CONTRACTMeet target−NPV risk↓ Severanceprevents thisTheory paper
Can compensation design prevent managers from gambling with shareholder value?
Optimal contracts feature high targets paired with severance pay so bad managers don't take negative-NPV risks. Severance should be contingent on results — complete failure nullifies payments.
// pipeline

Working papers

Working Paper · Jan 2026

Migration Fear, Information Access, and Analyst Forecast Accuracy

with C. Wan, Y. Wang, A. Yorulmaz
Anti-immigrant sentiment creates a racial accuracy gap in analyst forecasts. A one-SD increase in migration fear raises Non-White analysts' absolute forecast errors by $0.04 EPS with no effect on White peers. Non-White analysts see a 5.7pp drop in conference call participation during high-fear periods — suggesting societal tensions reduce private information sharing with minority analysts.
Working Paper · Mar 2026

Are Analyst Forecast Errors Really Kinky?

with M. Barth, J. Jeong, W. Landsman
The well-known "kink" in earnings surprises is widely attributed to earnings management — but ~66% is actually driven by analyst strategic behavior. Analysts under-revise EPS forecasts while bundling directionally consistent target price and recommendation revisions, creating predictable bias. Adjusting for bundling, the ratio of small beats to small misses falls from 2.43 to 1.49.
Available Soon

Embargoed Disclosure

Solo-authored
How pharmaceutical companies use embargo clauses in clinical trial contracts to control the timing and terms of disclosure — with consequences for market price discovery and public health.
// public goods

Intangible Capital Data & Code

Free parameters and capitalized intangible stocks from EPW (2024). Build more accurate balance sheets for any publicly traded firm. Used by researchers worldwide and applied in Morgan Stanley Investment Management research.

Code + Data → SDC-GVKEY Mapping → MD&A Text →
$ git clone intangible_capital
Cloning into 'intangible_capital'...
$ python construct_stocks.py
# EPW parameters: δ_k=0.15, δ_o=0.20
# Estimating knowledge + org capital...
# Adjusting balance sheets for 4,200 firms
# Output: adj_balance_sheet.csv
// writing

Notebook

Research notes, market commentary, and policy perspectives. Where academic rigor meets real-world application.

All
Market Signal
Research Notes
Policy
Market Signal
Why I'm Watching Biotech Volatility After the FDA's Latest Move
The FDA's accelerated approval pathway has implications that go beyond the obvious. Here's what the implied vol surface is telling us...
Mar 5, 2026
Research Notes
What the Embargo Paper Tells Us About Pharma Transparency
A preview of findings from my working paper on how pharmaceutical companies contractually suppress clinical trial disclosure...
Feb 22, 2026
Policy
Single-Trial FDA Approvals: A Response to Prasad & Makary
Prasad and Makary's NEJM proposal to lower approval standards would be less concerning if disclosure norms were stronger. Here's why...
Feb 10, 2026
// about

The path here

A chemist who became a financial economist — bringing a scientist's rigor to the messiest questions in capital markets.

EducationDuke UniversityB.A. Chemistry
U. South FloridaM.A. Chemistry · Highest Honors
NYU SternM.B.A. Finance · Highest Honors
2009Cornell UniversityPh.D. Accounting · Econometrics, Finance
2008–2016UNC-Chapel HillKenan-Flagler Business School
2016–2018Rice Businessvisitor at Jones Graduate School
2018–presentSouthern MethodistCox School of Business
↓ Download CV (PDF)

Before I studied markets, I studied molecules. My academic journey began in organic and polymer chemistry at Duke and the University of South Florida, where I learned to think in terms of systems, reactions, and equilibria. That scientific training — the insistence on rigor, on letting data and evidence lead, on theoretically questioning assumptions — became the foundation for everything that followed.

The pivot from pure science to capital markets and financial economics came at NYU Stern, where my focus in equity valuation and earnings quality gave me a front-row view of how information moves through markets — and how often it gets distorted along the way. That experience drove me to academia: I wanted to understand these distortions systematically, not just observe them anecdotally.

At Cornell, I found my intellectual home in information economics. My doctoral work, with additional concentrations in both econometrics and finance, gave me the methodological toolkit to study the deep structure of price discovery. Since then, my research has followed the information — wherever it gets produced, wherever it's corrupted, wherever it fails to reach the people who need it.

Today, my work spans from documenting racial bias in Wall Street analyst valuations, to exposing how pharmaceutical companies contractually suppress clinical trial results, to measuring the trillions in intangible assets that modern accounting systems systematically omit. The through-line is always the same question: when information breaks, who pays?

// teaching

In the classroom

I teach accounting the way I research it — by asking why and who cares. The goal is lasting intuition, not memorized rules.

Equity Valuation
MBA · EMBA · MAcc
6.3
/ 7.0
Financial Acct.
MBA · MS Finance · MS Mgmt
6.3
/ 7.0
Applied Valuation
Masters of Accounting
4.8
/ 5.0
Corporate Finance
Masters of Accounting
4.8
/ 5.0
"Professor Wang is the best — I wish he taught more courses. His emphasis on learning the material rather than memorizing should be adopted by the rest of the SMU faculty."— Student evaluation, SMU Cox
"I can't sum it up in 2 to 3 things... he genuinely may be the best professor I have ever had the pleasure of learning from. Never has a professor been so effective in teaching both the materials and how to dive deeper into the context."— Student evaluation, SMU Cox
"Sean encouraged us to think like investors, which is exactly what I was hoping for. He also made the course challenging enough to stimulate creative thinking."— Student evaluation, SMU Cox
// contact

Let's connect

SMU Cox School of Business · 6212 Bishop Blvd, Crow 375 · Dallas, TX 75275

hello@profsean.wang Google Scholar SSRN LinkedIn ↓ Download CV